An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.14.x. Access rights of Xenstore nodes are per domid. Unfortunately, existing granted access rights are not removed when a domain is being destroyed. This means that a new domain created with the same domid will inherit the access rights to Xenstore nodes from the previous domain(s) with the same domid. Because all Xenstore entries of a guest below /local/domain/<domid> are being deleted by Xen tools when a guest is destroyed, only Xenstore entries of other guests still running are affected. For example, a newly created guest domain might be able to read sensitive information that had belonged to a previously existing guest domain. Both Xenstore implementations (C and Ocaml) are vulnerable.
NOTE: The following CVSS v3.0 metrics and score provided are preliminary and subject to review.
|Base Score:||8.8||Base Metrics:||AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H|
|Access Vector:||Local network||Attack Complexity:||Low|
|Privileges Required:||Low||User Interaction:||None|
|Integrity Impact:||High||Availability Impact:||High|
|Oracle VM version 3 (xen)||OVMSA-2021-0014||2021-04-27|
|Oracle VM version 3.4 (xen)||OVMSA-2021-0014||2021-04-27|
This page is generated automatically and has not been checked for errors or omissions. For clarification or corrections please contact the Oracle Linux ULN team