Release Date: | 2025-03-06 | |
Impact: | Low | What is this? |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering When attaching uretprobes to processes running inside docker, the attached process is segfaulted when encountering the retprobe. The reason is that now that uretprobe is a system call the default seccomp filters in docker block it as they only allow a specific set of known syscalls. This is true for other userspace applications which use seccomp to control their syscall surface. Since uretprobe is a "kernel implementation detail" system call which is not used by userspace application code directly, it is impractical and there's very little point in forcing all userspace applications to explicitly allow it in order to avoid crashing tracked processes. Pass this systemcall through seccomp without depending on configuration. Note: uretprobe is currently only x86_64 and isn't expected to ever be supported in i386. [kees: minimized changes for easier backporting, tweaked commit log]
See more information about CVE-2025-21834 from MITRE CVE dictionary and NIST NVD
NOTE: The following CVSS metrics and score provided are preliminary and subject to review.
Base Score: | 5.5 |
Vector String: | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H |
Version: | 3.1 |
Attack Vector: | Local |
Attack Complexity: | Low |
Privileges Required: | Low |
User Interaction: | None |
Scope: | Unchanged |
Confidentiality Impact: | None |
Integrity Impact: | None |
Availability Impact: | High |
Platform | Errata | Release Date |
Oracle Linux version 10 (kernel-uek) | ELSA-2025-20480 | 2025-07-17 |
Oracle Linux version 9 (kernel-uek) | ELSA-2025-20480 | 2025-07-17 |
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