Release Date: | 2025-08-11 | |
Impact: | Moderate | What is this? |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: clone_private_mnt(): make sure that caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the right userns What we want is to verify there is that clone won't expose something hidden by a mount we wouldn't be able to undo. "Wouldn't be able to undo" may be a result of MNT_LOCKED on a child, but it may also come from lacking admin rights in the userns of the namespace mount belongs to. clone_private_mnt() checks the former, but not the latter. There's a number of rather confusing CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks in various userns during the mount, especially with the new mount API; they serve different purposes and in case of clone_private_mnt() they usually, but not always end up covering the missing check mentioned above.
See more information about CVE-2025-38499 from MITRE CVE dictionary and NIST NVD
NOTE: The following CVSS metrics and score provided are preliminary and subject to review.
Base Score: | 7.0 |
Vector String: | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
Version: | 3.1 |
Attack Vector: | Local |
Attack Complexity: | High |
Privileges Required: | Low |
User Interaction: | None |
Scope: | Unchanged |
Confidentiality Impact: | High |
Integrity Impact: | High |
Availability Impact: | High |
Platform | Errata | Release Date |
Oracle Linux version 10 (kernel-uek) | ELSA-2025-20551 | 2025-09-08 |
Oracle Linux version 9 (kernel-uek) | ELSA-2025-20551 | 2025-09-08 |
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