| Release Date: | 2026-08-10 | |
| Impact: | Important | What is this? |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: initialize standalone TCP-AO response padding tcp_v4_send_ack() and tcp_v6_send_response() construct standalone TCP responses with TCP-AO options. The option length carries the actual MAC length, but the TCP header length includes the option rounded up to a four-byte boundary. tcp_ao_hash_hdr() writes the MAC only. Thus, when the MAC length is not four-byte aligned, the one to three bytes after the MAC are left uninitialized and may be transmitted. For the normal TCP-AO hashing mode, those bytes also have to be initialized before computing the MAC. Initialize only the alignment padding in the TCP-AO branches, before hashing the header. Use TCPOPT_NOP, as in the normal TCP-AO output path. This avoids adding work to non-AO TCP responses while preserving a valid authenticated header.
See more information about CVE-2026-68119 from MITRE CVE dictionary and NIST NVD
NOTE: The following CVSS metrics and score provided are preliminary and subject to review.
| Base Score: | 5.5 |
| Vector String: | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H |
| Version: | 3.1 |
| Attack Vector: | Local |
| Attack Complexity: | Low |
| Privileges Required: | Low |
| User Interaction: | None |
| Scope: | Unchanged |
| Confidentiality Impact: | None |
| Integrity Impact: | None |
| Availability Impact: | High |
| Platform | Errata | Release Date |
| Oracle Linux version 10 (kernel-uek) | ELSA-2026-500248 | 2026-09-04 |
| Oracle Linux version 9 (kernel-uek) | ELSA-2026-500248 | 2026-09-04 |
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