CVE-2026-89628

CVE Details

Release Date:	2026-09-11
Impact:	Moderate	What is this?

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: picolcd: clamp eeprom debugfs read to bytes actually received picolcd_debug_eeprom_read() trusts resp->raw_data[2] -- a length byte supplied by the device in its REPORT_EE_DATA reply -- clamped only to the caller's read() count: ret = resp->raw_data[2]; if (ret > s) ret = s; if (copy_to_user(u, resp->raw_data+3, ret)) It never checks resp->raw_size, the number of bytes picolcd_raw_event() actually copied into the 64-byte raw_data[] of the kmalloc'd struct picolcd_pending. A device (or a spoofed picoLCD) returning a length byte of 0xff, read with a count >= 255, makes copy_to_user() read past raw_data[] into adjacent slab memory and return it to userspace through the debugfs "eeprom" file: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user Read of size 255 ... picolcd_debug_eeprom_read+0x214/0x2f0 [hid_picolcd] The debug-dump path in the same file already validates the device length byte against the received size before trusting it; this read does not. The file is created S_IRUSR (root-only) and a crafted device is needed, so it is neither unprivileged- nor remotely-triggerable. Clamp the copy length to resp->raw_size - 3 (the payload actually received, minus the 3-byte header), floored at 0 for short replies.

See more information about CVE-2026-89628 from MITRE CVE dictionary and NIST NVD

NOTE: The following CVSS metrics and score provided are preliminary and subject to review.

CVSS v3 metrics

Base Score:	2.3
Vector String:	CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Version:	3.1
Attack Vector:	Local
Attack Complexity:	Low
Privileges Required:	High
User Interaction:	None
Scope:	Unchanged
Confidentiality Impact:	Low
Integrity Impact:	None
Availability Impact:	None

Errata information

Platform	Errata	Release Date
Oracle Linux version 9 (kernel-uek)	ELSA-2026-500374	2026-10-07