The following CVE are available for all releases offered through Unbreakable Linux Network (ULN). |
|
| CVE-2026-98127 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/client: validate new EOF for insert range
smb3_insert_range() does not check if the new file size
(i_size + len) is valid. This allows FALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGE to bypass
RLIMIT_FSIZE, exceed s_maxbytes, or produce a size outside the loff_t
range.
Use check_add_overflow() to calculate the new EOF. Validate it with
inode_newsize_ok() before modifying the file.
Reproducer, using a file on a CIFS mount:
bash -c '
FILE=/mnt/cifs/repro
trap "" SIGXFSZ
ulimit -f 3072 # RLIMIT_FSIZE = 3 MiB
# A regular write is stopped at 3 MiB.
dd if=/dev/zero of="$FILE" bs=1M count=4 status=none
stat -c "size after write: %s" "$FILE"
# Insert 2 MiB into a 2 MiB file.
truncate -s 2M "$FILE"
fallocate -i -o 0 -l 2M "$FILE"
stat -c "size after insert: %s" "$FILE"
'
Before this change, the regular write stops at the 3 MiB limit, but
insert range grows the file to 4 MiB:
dd: error writing '/mnt/cifs/repro': File too large
size after write: 3145728
size after insert: 4194304
After this change, insert range also fails at the limit and leaves the
2 MiB file unchanged:
dd: error writing '/mnt/cifs/repro': File too large
size after write: 3145728
fallocate: fallocate failed: File too large
size after insert: 2097152 | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98126 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/client: validate new EOF for zero range
When FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE is used without FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE,
smb3_zero_range() may extend EOF without checking RLIMIT_FSIZE, allowing
the file to grow beyond the caller's file-size limit.
Fix this by calling inode_newsize_ok() before sending the zero-range
request when the operation would extend EOF.
Reproducer, using a file on a CIFS mount:
bash -c '
FILE=/mnt/cifs/repro
trap "" SIGXFSZ
ulimit -f 3072
truncate -s 2M "$FILE"
fallocate --zero-range -o 0 -l 4M "$FILE"
echo "fallocate rc=$?"
stat -c "file size=%s" "$FILE"
'
Before this change, the operation succeeds despite the 3 MiB limit:
fallocate rc=0
file size=4194304
After this change, fallocate fails and leaves the file at 2 MiB. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98123 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: fix soft lockup from unpadded ASCONF-ACK parameter iteration
sctp_verify_asconf() walks ASCONF-ACK parameters with
sctp_walk_params(), which advances by SCTP_PAD4(length), while the
consumer sctp_get_asconf_response() iterates the same parameters
advancing by the raw length, without padding. A single odd-length
parameter desynchronises the two walks and makes the consumer
interpret attacker-controlled bytes at a misaligned offset.
When those bytes yield a length of zero, the while loop over
asconf_ack_len makes no progress, spinning forever in softirq
context, and the watchdog reports a soft lockup. All reads stay
within the received skb, so the lockup is a pure remote denial of
service. A remote peer can trigger it with a crafted ASCONF-ACK on
an ADD-IP enabled association with an outstanding ASCONF (RFC 5061
section 4.1.2 requires the chunk to be authenticated, but the
predefined empty key id 0 allows the peer to compute the same
association HMAC from publicly exchanged parameters, so the gate
does not help).
The SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE case of sctp_verify_asconf() also performs
no length check, letting a parameter without a complete error
header reach the consumer, which reads errhdr.cause past the end of
the parameter, an out-of-bounds read.
Reject SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE parameters shorter than
sizeof(struct sctp_addip_param) + sizeof(struct sctp_errhdr) at the
verifier, and advance the consumer iterator with the same padding
rule as the verifier to keep the two walks in lockstep. The verifier
change guarantees a complete error header in every ERR_CAUSE
parameter the consumer can see, so the consumer's asconf_ack_len
check is dropped and it returns err_param->cause directly. The
consumer padding fix is still required because odd lengths remain
valid for SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE per RFC 5061.
The issue was found by ZeroHive, a vulnerability hunting agent at
Tencent Yunding Lab. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98122 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: mdb: Fix use-after-free in vxlan_mdb_remote_src_del()
vxlan_mdb_is_valid_source(), which validates MDBE_ATTR_SOURCE and every
MDBE_ATTR_SRC_LIST member, accepts the all-zeros address.
A source list is only accepted on a (*, G) entry, whose source is the
all-zeros address, and for each member of the list an (S, G) entry is
derived from it by substituting the source. Entries are keyed by a plain
memcmp() of struct vxlan_mdb_entry_key, so if MDBE_ATTR_SOURCE is present
and holds the all-zeros address and the source list holds it as well, the
derived (S, G) key is byte-identical to the (*, G) key and resolves to the
same entry. Omitting MDBE_ATTR_SOURCE is not equivalent, as the key is
then left with a zero address family.
vxlan_mdb_remote_src_del() removes the forwarding entry of a source before
freeing the source entry:
vxlan_mdb_remote_src_fwd_del(vxlan, group, remote, &ent->addr);
vxlan_mdb_remote_src_entry_del(ent);
With the keys aliased, the first call deletes the remote of the entry that
owns 'ent' instead of a separate (S, G) entry, and frees 'ent'. The second
call then runs on the freed entry, and its hlist_del() reads ->pprev and
->next out of it and writes through them.
Adding the (*, G) entry with NLM_F_REPLACE and no source list marks the
all-zeros source for deletion and reaches this from the sweep at the end
of vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_replace().
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __vxlan_mdb_add+0x1cd/0xd70
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888102852500 by task poc/84
__vxlan_mdb_add+0x1cd/0xd70
vxlan_mdb_add+0xc0/0x140
rtnl_mdb_add+0x157/0x2a0
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x207/0x5a0
Allocated by task 84:
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x153/0x360
vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_add+0x2eb/0x440
__vxlan_mdb_add+0x803/0xd70
Freed by task 84:
kfree+0x14c/0x3b0
vxlan_mdb_remote_del+0x129/0x1a0
__vxlan_mdb_del+0x4f/0xe0
vxlan_mdb_remote_src_fwd_del.isra.0+0x162/0x1b0
__vxlan_mdb_add+0x1c5/0xd70
The MDB operations are netns-scoped, so an unprivileged user can perform
them in a new user and network namespace.
Reject the all-zeros address in vxlan_mdb_is_valid_source(), which covers
both call sites. A (*, G) entry is expressed by omitting the source, so
nothing legitimate is refused.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98116 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: pcm: Serialize PCM mmap with buffer reallocation to fix page UAF
snd_pcm_hw_params() and snd_pcm_hw_free() guard buffer reallocation
with an mmap_count check performed under the PCM stream lock, but the
lock is released long before the buffer is actually freed:
snd_pcm_sync_stop(), constraint refinement and do_free_pages() all
happen in between. snd_pcm_mmap_data(), on the other hand, takes no
lock at all: it validates against the old buffer's state and
dma_bytes, remaps its pages into the VMA, and only then increments
mmap_count.
A concurrent mmap() can therefore slip in between the check and the
free. remap_pfn_range() installs writable PTEs for the old buffer's
pages without taking page references, and the subsequent
do_free_pages() returns those pages to the page allocator while the
VMA still maps them. This leaves a stale, writable mapping of freed
pages: a page-level use-after-free that can be leveraged for local
privilege escalation.
Make snd_pcm_mmap_data() participate in the buffer-access scheme
introduced for hw_params/hw_free: acquire runtime->buffer_accessing
before validating and remapping, and release it afterwards. Buffer
reallocation already fails with -EBUSY while accessors are active,
and the mmap side now fails with -EBUSY while a reallocation is in
progress, so the validate/remap sequence and the check/free sequence
can no longer interleave.
A reproducer that turns this race into a stale writable mapping of
the freed DMA buffer pages is available on request. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98111 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btintel: validate version TLV value lengths
btintel_parse_version_tlv() verifies that a complete TLV is present in
the response, but it does not ensure that the value is long enough for
the specific TLV type. A short value can therefore cause an
out-of-bounds read through get_unaligned_le16(), get_unaligned_le32(),
or memcpy().
Reject values shorter than the minimum required by each known TLV type.
Also reject responses that do not contain the Command Complete Status
field. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98110 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btintel: bound firmware ID by TLV length
The firmware ID is treated as a NUL-terminated string even though the
TLV length is its only boundary. If the value does not contain a NUL
terminator, snprintf() can read beyond the received response.
Limit the conversion to the advertised TLV value length. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98109 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix race condition during device registration
In hci_register_dev(), the power_on work item is queued to
hdev->req_workqueue before initializing hdev->adv_monitors_idr and
registering the MSFT extension via msft_register(). For devices marked with
quirks such as HCI_QUIRK_RAW_DEVICE, the HCI_UNCONFIGURED flag is set on
the device. When the power_on work item runs concurrently on another CPU,
hci_power_on() detects that the device is unconfigured and immediately
invokes hci_dev_do_close(), which calls msft_do_close().
Concurrently, msft_register() allocates the msft structure and exposes it
to hdev->msft_data prior to calling mutex_init(&msft->filter_lock). If
msft_do_close() executes while hdev->msft_data is already assigned but the
mutex has not yet been initialized, mutex_lock(&msft->filter_lock) operates
on an uninitialized mutex, triggering a DEBUG_LOCKS warning:
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock)
WARNING: kernel/locking/mutex.c:625 at __mutex_lock_common
kernel/locking/mutex.c:625 [inline]
WARNING: kernel/locking/mutex.c:625 at __mutex_lock+0x12d8/0x1550
kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
...
Call Trace:
msft_do_close+0x308/0x7b0 net/bluetooth/msft.c:693
hci_dev_close_sync+0x86b/0x10a0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5522
hci_dev_do_close net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:499 [inline]
hci_power_on+0x32c/0x750 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:937
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3322 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa8e/0x14e0 kernel/workqueue.c:3405
worker_thread+0x92d/0xe10 kernel/workqueue.c:3486
kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
Fix this by moving the queue_work() call in hci_register_dev() to after
idr_init(&hdev->adv_monitors_idr) and msft_register(hdev) so that device
structures and extensions are fully initialized before asynchronous tasks
can access them. Additionally, assign hdev->msft_data in msft_register()
only after mutex_init(&msft->filter_lock) has completed. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98108 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix chan mode for LE_CONN_REQ + EXT_FLOWCTL pchan
l2cap_new_connection() sets default value of channel mode to match the
parent channel. l2cap_le_connect_req() left this at the default, and
created L2CAP_MODE_EXT_FLOWCTL channels if listening pchan has that
mode. This causes FLAG_DEFER_SETUP channels to reply to
L2CAP_LE_CONN_REQ with L2CAP_ECRED_CONN_RSP, which is incorrect.
It can also result to stack OOB write (of l2cap_alloc_cid determined
values) in l2cap_ecred_rsp_defer(), as l2cap_le_connect_req() does not
limit maximum number of deferred channels or check for duplicate ident.
Fix by setting chan->mode correctly in l2cap_le_connect_req().
Also check channel mode in l2cap_ecred_rsp_defer(), and do WARN_ON_ONCE
instead of OOB write to make it less brittle. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98107 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix out-of-bounds write in l2cap_ecred_connect
l2cap_chan_connect() tries to ensure there are no more than
L2CAP_ECRED_CONN_SCID_MAX pending ECRED channels, so they fit in the
same L2CAP_ECRED_CONN_REQ that l2cap_ecred_connect() constructs.
However, the check only counts deferred channels. If 6 L2CAP sockets
are connected at the same time in order DDDDND (D=deferred,
N=non-deferred), the last can bump the total to max+1. It results to
one __le16 written out of bounds of the scid array, and an invalid
ECRED_CONN_REQ being sent.
Fix by leaving room for the non-deferred pending ECRED channels in the
counting in l2cap_chan_connect(), so the limit can't be exceeded.
Move counting under same critical section where the channel is added.
Although race conditions involving this appear unreachable, it's easier
to see.
Also add WARN_ON_ONCE check in l2cap_ecred_defer_connect() to make this
less brittle. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98104 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_u32: fix duplicate handle when node ID pool is exhausted
gen_new_kid() falls back to returning max (htid | 0xFFF) when both
idr_alloc_u32() ranges are full, instead of reporting an error.
u32_change() trusts that value and inserts a new knode with a handle
that is already live in the hash table, breaking handle uniqueness
within the table's node ID space.
The handle was never reserved in ht->handle_idr, so every later error
path that does idr_remove(&ht->handle_idr, handle) removes the
reservation of a different, live knode, which is then reused -- one
failed add compounds into further duplicates.
The 4095 limit is per (table, bucket) -- ht->handle_idr is per hash
table and the range is derived from htid (bucketid), so a table with
divisor 256 can legitimately hold 256*4095 knodes.
The sibling helper gen_new_htid() has the same silent in-band failure:
it returns 0 when the tp_c handle pool (1..0x7FF) is full, and
u32_init() publishes the root hash table with handle 0 without
checking. Two root tables with handle 0 alias in u32_lookup_ht(),
allowing cross-tcf_proto knode add/lookup/delete. Add the same
exhaustion check that the divisor path already has.
Return an error so u32_change() fails with ENOSPC/ENOMEM when the
node ID space is exhausted, and so u32_init() fails with -ENOMEM
when the hash table ID space is exhausted. The extack message
distinguishes pool exhaustion (-ENOSPC) from a transient allocation
failure (-ENOMEM).
Conditions to recreate the bug:
- CONFIG_NET_SCHED=y, CONFIG_CLS_U32=y (or =m with module loaded)
- Create a clsact qdisc on a device, then add 4095 u32 filters with
auto-generated handles to fill the node ID space for the root hash
table (single bucket). The 4096th auto-handle filter add triggers
the duplicate handle (fh 800::fff reused). Reachable at Level 2
(unshare -Urn, namespace-local CAP_NET_ADMIN).
- For gen_new_htid: create 2047 u32 proto entries on the same block
to fill the tp_c handle pool, then create one more. The root table
gets handle 0 and aliases with other handle-0 root tables. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98103 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
igmp: convert struct ip_sf_list to RCU
Commit 23d2b94043ca ("igmp: Add ip_mc_list lock in ip_check_mc_rcu")
added spin_lock_bh(&im->lock) to ip_check_mc_rcu() to prevent a
use-after-free while iterating im->sources during concurrent deletions.
However, ip_check_mc_rcu() is called from RCU read-side critical
sections in packet receive and route lookup fast paths (e.g.
__mkroute_output(), ip_route_input_rcu(), and __udp4_lib_rcv()).
When igmpv3_send_cr() or igmpv3_send_report() holds &pmc->lock and
calls add_grec() -> igmpv3_newpack() -> ip_route_output_ports(),
an XFRM policy matching a multicast destination triggers
xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one() -> xfrm4_get_saddr() -> __mkroute_output() ->
ip_check_mc_rcu(). This attempts to acquire &im->lock while &pmc->lock
is already held on the same CPU, triggering a lockdep recursive locking
warning / deadlock.
Fix this by converting IPv4 struct ip_sf_list to RCU, mirroring the
IPv6 implementation in net/ipv6/mcast.c:
1. Add struct rcu_head to struct ip_sf_list and annotate sf_next,
sources, and tomb as __rcu pointers.
2. Use rcu_assign_pointer() and kfree_rcu() for list updates and
deletions.
3. Remove spin_lock_bh(&im->lock) from ip_check_mc_rcu() and traverse
im->sources locklessly with for_each_psf_rcu(), reading and writing
counter fields with READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE().
Note: RCU conversion of /proc/net/mcfilter will be done in a
separate patch. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98102 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: mcast: fix RCU list diversion in ip6_mc_del1_src()
When removing a source filter whose count reaches zero, ip6_mc_del1_src()
unlinks psf from pmc->mca_sources. If the filter was previously active,
the code moved psf directly into pmc->mca_tomb by updating psf->sf_next.
Because pmc->mca_sources is traversed locklessly under RCU (e.g. by
ipv6_chk_mcast_addr()), mutating psf->sf_next before a grace period
elapses diverts concurrent readers to the tombstone list. Consequently,
readers miss remaining active sources in pmc->mca_sources and improperly
examine deleted tombstone entries.
Fix this by allocating a new tombstone node for pmc->mca_tomb (as done
in sf_setstate()) and retiring the original psf via kfree_rcu(). | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98098 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix NULL deref in tipc_named_node_up() on empty publication list
User-space applications can bind a large number of service addresses to
one or more sockets. Each binding of a local-scope service address inserts
one entry (publication) into the TIPC name table. If the number of these
publications exceeds TIPC_MAX_PUBL (65535), protocol service types
(such as node state and link state) are no longer inserted into the name
table. This causes two issues:
1. User-space applications subscribing to node or link up/down events
stop receiving notifications.
2. A NULL pointer dereference can occur:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000d0
...
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4-default+ #5 PREEMPT(full)
...
RIP: 0010:tipc_named_node_up (./include/linux/skbuff.h:2251 net/tipc/name_distr.c:195 net/tipc/name_distr.c:221)
...
Call Trace:
tipc_node_write_unlock (net/tipc/node.c:428)
tipc_rcv (net/tipc/node.c:934 net/tipc/node.c:2189)
tipc_udp_recv (net/tipc/udp_media.c:389)
Thread 1 (tipc_net_finalize) | Thread 2 (named_distribute)
-----------------------------|-----------------------------
| ...
| list_for_each_entry(publ, pls, binding_node) {
| ...
| __skb_queue_tail(list, skb);
| ...
| }
| ...
| hdr = buf_msg(skb_peek_tail(list));
... |
tipc_nametbl_publish(); |
If 'tipc_nametbl_publish()' (Thread 1) fails because the number of
local publications reaches TIPC_MAX_PUBL, list (Thread 2) will be empty. As a
result, NULL is passed to 'buf_msg()', leading to a NULL pointer dereference.
Fix these issues by allowing protocol service types (node state, link state,
and topology server) to be inserted into the name table unconditionally.
This ensures that users subscribing to these types always receive
notifications. In addition, the maximum number of local user publications is
reduced to (TIPC_MAX_PUBL - 1). This ensures that the maximum bulk size
calculated in tipc_link_set_queue_limits() remains valid. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98097 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: Dont send random pad bytes in RESET/ACTIVATE messages
The interface name is passed in a fixed length (TIPC_MAX_IF_NAME) buffer.
Replace the strcpy(data, l->if_name) with memcpy() so that the
pad bytes are actually written (l->if_name[] is zero padded)
rather than sending random bytes from the skb to the remote system.
Replace two other strcpy() with strscpy(). | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98096 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: sr: restore network header before routing and forwarding
ipv6_srh_rcv() runs with skb->data at the Segment Routing Header (SRH)
while skb_network_header() points at the IPv6 header.
When segments_left > 0, ipv6_srh_rcv() previously restored the skb->data
position by pushing sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), assuming the SRH immediately
followed the fixed IPv6 header. If another extension header (such as a
Hop-by-Hop options header) precedes the SRH, skb_network_offset()
remained negative.
This led to two problems:
1. During ip6_route_input(), fib6_rules_early_flow_dissect() invokes
__skb_flow_dissect() which passes the negative skb_network_offset()
to flow dissection, breaking BPF and C flow dissector logic.
2. If forwarded via ip6_forward() or redirected via act_mirred, downstream
handlers (like sch_fragment() or neighbour output) pass the negative
offset as an unsigned length, triggering OOB memcpy or buffer overflows.
Fix this by pushing -skb_network_offset(skb) before routing, ensuring
skb_network_offset(skb) is 0 for route lookup / flow dissection as well as
downstream forwarding. On the loopback path, pull skb_transport_offset(skb)
to restore skb->data to the SRH before looping back. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98095 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_packet: Don't cast tpacket_hdr.tp_len to int in tpacket_parse_header().
syzbot reported BUG() in sock_sendmsg_nosec(). [0]
The problem is that tpacket_parse_header() casts user-provided
tpacket_hdr.tp_len, which is u32, to int.
If the length is larger than INT_MAX, the following condition
in tpacket_parse_header() passes,
if (unlikely(tp_len > size_max))
and any negative value can be returned to the caller, up to
sock_sendmsg_nosec().
The repro set tpacket_hdr.tp_len to 0xfffffdef, which is cast
to -EIOCBQUEUED (-529), triggering BUG() in sock_sendmsg_nosec().
*(uint64_t*)0x200000000008 = 0xfffffdef;
...
syscall(__NR_write, /*fd=*/r[0], /*buf=*/0x200000000000ul, /*count=*/1ul);
Let's define the local tp_len as u32 in tpacket_parse_header().
[0]:
kernel BUG at net/socket.c:803!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5628 Comm: syz-executor176 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/24/2026
RIP: 0010:sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x145/0x180 net/socket.c:803
Code: 06 67 48 0f b9 3a eb 95 e8 e8 3a 22 f8 48 89 df 4c 89 f6 4c 89 e2 4d 89 fb 2e e8 32 a5 5c 16 e9 51 ff ff ff e8 cc 3a 22 f8 90 <0f> 0b e8 c4 3a 22 f8 48 83 c3 18 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 28
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003aefb48 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff89a578d4 RBX: ffff8880764c67c0 RCX: ffff88807fb23e80
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000fffffdef RDI: 00000000fffffdef
RBP: 00000000fffffdef R08: ffffc90003aef747 R09: 1ffff9200075dee8
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff5200075dee9 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffffc90003aefbc0 R15: ffffffff8aac4310
FS: 000055559101b400(0000) GS:ffff888124ce0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000200000000210 CR3: 0000000073dca000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:815 [inline]
sock_write_iter+0x2de/0x3e0 net/socket.c:1266
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline]
vfs_write+0x612/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:687
ksys_write+0x150/0x270 fs/read_write.c:739
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f173130ecb9
Code: c0 79 93 eb d5 48 8d 7c 1d 00 eb 99 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 d8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffd67e44248 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000200000000000 RCX: 00007f173130ecb9
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000200000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd67e44388
R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 00002000000000c0 R15: 0000000000000002
| 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98092 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: amd: yc: fix memory leak in acp6x_pdm_dma_close()
acp6x_pdm_dma_close() does not free the runtime->private_data buffer
allocated in acp6x_pdm_dma_open(). Add the missing kfree. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98091 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: detach failed sprout device from transaction update list
When creating the first metadata chunk for a sprout filesystem,
create_chunk() adds the new device to the transaction dev_update_list
through device->post_commit_list.
If the subsequent system chunk creation fails, btrfs_init_new_device()
aborts the transaction and releases the device while post_commit_list is
still linked. This triggers a warning in btrfs_free_device() and leaves
the transaction list referencing freed memory.
Detach the device while holding chunk_mutex before releasing it. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98090 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: restore active device pointers after failed sprout
btrfs_init_new_device() switches latest_dev and possibly s_bdev from the
seed device to the new sprout device before creating the first writable
chunks.
If chunk creation or the subsequent sprout setup fails, the error path
releases the new device without switching those pointers back.
btrfs_show_devname() can then dereference the freed latest_dev and crash.
Restore the active device pointers to the latest seed device before
removing and releasing the failed sprout device. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98089 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: alb: fix uninitialized transport header access in alb_determine_nd()
alb_determine_nd() uses icmp6_hdr(skb) to inspect ICMPv6 headers.
However, in xmit paths (e.g. packets sent via AF_PACKET / raw sockets
or forwarded packets), skb->transport_header is not guaranteed to be
initialized. While pskb_network_may_pull() ensures the packet data is
linear starting from the network header, it does not set or adjust the
transport header offset.
Dereferencing icmp6_hdr(skb) can therefore access out-of-bounds memory.
Fetch the icmp6hdr directly after ipv6hdr following pskb_network_may_pull(),
and reload ipv6hdr in case pskb_may_pull() reallocated skb->head.
Also remove the unused bond argument from alb_determine_nd(). | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98088 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: mpt3sas: Avoid out-of-bounds cpumask_of_node() call in _base_assign_reply_queues()
dev_to_node() can return NUMA_NO_NODE (-1) on systems without NUMA
topology information for the PCI device, such as single-socket boards
that don't expose device-to-node affinity. Passing -1 directly into
cpumask_of_node() indexes node_to_cpumask_map[-1], an out-of-bounds
array read caught by UBSAN:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in arch/x86/include/asm/topology.h:72:28
index -1 is out of range for type 'cpumask *[1024]'
Fall back to cpu_online_mask when no NUMA node is available, rather than
assuming dev_to_node() always returns a valid node index. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98086 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: ump: do not touch legacy_rmidi before it exists
snd_ump_parse_endpoint() sets ump->parsed on every exit, including
error, before the caller attaches the legacy rawmidi device.
ump_handle_ep_name_msg() then treats parsed as "legacy_rmidi is live"
and calls ump_legacy_set_rawmidi_name(), which snprintf()s into
ump->legacy_rmidi->name. If a UMP packet arrives in that window
(IRQ path from snd_ump_receive), legacy_rmidi is still NULL
(KASAN null-ptr-deref in snprintf).
Guard the legacy helpers. parsed only means endpoint info was
parsed, not that legacy_rmidi exists. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98083 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix transaction use-after-free in raid stripe insertion
If allocation of a RAID stripe extent fails,
btrfs_insert_one_raid_extent() aborts and ends the transaction before
returning -ENOMEM.
btrfs_finish_one_ordered(), the production caller through
btrfs_insert_raid_extent(), still owns the transaction handle. It handles
the error by aborting the transaction and then reaches the common exit
path, which ends the transaction again.
The premature end can free the handle and drop its transaction reference.
Transaction cleanup can then free the transaction before the caller's
second abort accesses the handle and transaction, resulting in
use-after-free.
Keep the abort at the failure site, but let the caller's common exit path
end the transaction once, after it has finished using both objects. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98082 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix the possible bioc_list memory leak during error
There are two possible ways to leak bioc memory on
btrfs_ordered_extent::bioc_list:
- An error occurred for btrfs_insert_one_raid_extent()
Then the function btrfs_insert_raid_extent() immediately return
without freeing any bioc in the bioc_list.
- An ordered extent hit an IO error
In that case the ordered extent will have BTRFS_ORDERED_IOERR set, and
skip the call on btrfs_insert_raid_extent() completely.
Fix the problem by:
- Introduce a new helper, btrfs_cleanup_ordered_bioc_list()
Which will remove all bioc from the bioc_list, and release the bioc.
- Call the above helper for btrfs_insert_raid_extent()
So that the cleanup helper is always called no matter what.
- Call the above helper for btrfs_finish_one_ordered()
This is called just before the final release on the ordered extent.
This was reported by Sashiko when reviewing another patch. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98081 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: zoned: finish active block group cleanup if call_zone_finish() fails
do_zone_finish() clears BLOCK_GROUP_FLAG_ZONE_IS_ACTIVE before finishing
the zones. If call_zone_finish() then fails it returned early, leaving the
now inactive block group on fs_info->zone_active_bgs, leaking its
reference, the BTRFS_FS_NEED_ZONE_FINISH waiters are never woken, and as
its alloc_offset equals the zone capacity btrfs_zone_finish_one_bg() keeps
selecting it, spinning btrfs_zoned_activate_one_bg().
Fall through to the cleanup on failure too and return the error, but keep
the block group read-only as its zones are left inconsistent. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98080 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: do not force reloc root creation during qgroup_account_snapshot()
[BUG]
When running btrfs/252 with quota enabled through MKFS_OPTIONS="-O quota",
it has a high chance to trigger the following kernel warning and flips
the fs RO:
BTRFS info (device dm-2): relocating block group 30408704 flags metadata|dup
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:879 at lookup_inline_extent_backref+0x74b/0x960 [btrfs], CPU#4: btrfs/2173
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 2173 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 7.2.0-rc6-custom+ #457 PREEMPT(full) 3adc6528fb66f7a55fe1095385818e742f200aab
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022
RIP: 0010:lookup_inline_extent_backref+0x74b/0x960 [btrfs]
Call Trace:
insert_inline_extent_backref+0x7c/0x160 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72]
__btrfs_inc_extent_ref+0xa9/0x270 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72]
__btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x4af/0x11c0 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72]
btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x9d/0xf0 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72]
create_pending_snapshot+0x39d/0xf00 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72]
create_pending_snapshots+0x9b/0xc0 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72]
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x280/0xeb0 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72]
prepare_to_relocate+0x147/0x200 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72]
relocate_block_group+0x6b/0x5e0 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72]
btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x92c/0x2380 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72]
btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x3f/0x1a0 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72]
btrfs_balance+0xa2c/0x19c0 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72]
btrfs_ioctl+0x2839/0x2d30 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x416/0x9a0
do_syscall_64+0xe1/0x790
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
BTRFS info (device dm-2): leaf 4593991680 gen 233 total ptrs 175 free space 5953 owner 2
BTRFS info (device dm-2): refs 3 lock_owner 2173 current 2173
item 0 key (166772736 METADATA_ITEM 1) itemoff 16250 itemsize 33
extent refs 1 gen 222 flags 2
ref#0: tree block backref root 266
[ Skip the tree dump ]
item 174 key (263225344 METADATA_ITEM 0) itemoff 10328 itemsize 33
extent refs 1 gen 162 flags 258
ref#0: tree block backref root 267
BTRFS error (device dm-2): extent item not found for insert, bytenr 179847168 num_bytes 16384 parent 4594335744 root_objectid 273 owner 0 offset 0
BTRFS error (device dm-2): failed to run delayed ref for logical 179847168 num_bytes 16384 type 182 action 1 ref_mod 1: -117
[CAUSE]
The above error is showing that there is a tree reference to a metadata
extent that is no longer there.
With "ref_verify" mount option (requires CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG), there is
some extra debug output:
BTRFS error (device dm-2): dumping block entry [180961280 16384], num_refs 0, metadata 1, from disk 0
BTRFS error (device dm-2): root entry 256, num_refs 18446744073709551615
BTRFS error (device dm-2): root entry 273, num_refs 18446744073709551615
BTRFS error (device dm-2): Ref action 3, root 273, ref_root 273, parent 0, owner 0, offset 0, num_refs 1
btrfs_force_cow_block+0x129/0x7d0 [btrfs]
btrfs_cow_block+0x10a/0x250 [btrfs]
btrfs_search_slot+0x5eb/0xf40 [btrfs]
btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x3a/0x70 [btrfs]
insert_with_overflow+0x53/0x130 [btrfs]
btrfs_insert_dir_item+0x125/0x290 [btrfs]
btrfs_add_link+0xaa/0x410 [btrfs]
btrfs_rename+0x5ea/0xcd0 [btrfs]
btrfs_rename2+0x28/0x60 [btrfs]
vfs_rename+0x5b2/0xe10
filename_renameat2+0x244/0x430
__x64_sys_rename+0x48/0x70
do_syscall_64+0xe1/0x790
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
---truncated--- | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98078 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: fix reversed sequence option serialization
hton_seq() expects the host-order source first and the unaligned
network-order destination second. The version 1 sync sender passes these
arguments in reverse for both sequence blocks. This leaves 24 bytes of the
kmalloc-backed message unwritten. It may disclose stale heap data and
replace the live connection sequence state with values read from the
buffer.
Pass the connection sequence state as the source and the message payload as
the destination for both blocks. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98077 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: fix OOB read in sip_skip_whitespace()
sip_skip_whitespace() returns dptr unchanged when its own loop
exhausts the buffer (dptr == limit), instead of NULL like its sibling
sip_follow_continuation() returns on its own "no more data" path.
ct_sip_get_header() only checks for NULL after calling it:
dptr = sip_skip_whitespace(dptr, limit);
if (dptr == NULL)
break;
if (*dptr != ':' || ++dptr >= limit)
break;
so a recognized header name followed only by spaces/tabs running to
the exact end of the SIP payload, with no colon, makes the very next
statement read one byte past the buffer.
Make both "no more data" outcomes return NULL, matching the
convention sip_follow_continuation() already uses and that both
existing callers already check for. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98076 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/probes: Fix use-after-free on field name/type of events with multiple probes
The fields of a probe-based dynamic event (kprobe, uprobe, eprobe and
fprobe events) are created in traceprobe_define_arg_fields() by handing
the probe_arg name/type strings to trace_define_field(), which only
stores the pointers without copying. Those strings are owned by the
trace_probe and are freed when that probe is removed.
An event can have several probes attached. The field list is defined
only once, by the first probe that registers the event, but it is kept
alive by any surviving sibling probe. Deleting just that first probe by
symbol -
# primary A: fields are defined from A's args
echo 'p:kprobes/ev vfs_read a1=$arg1' > kprobe_events
# append B: shares A's event call
echo 'p:kprobes/ev vfs_write a1=$arg1' >> kprobe_events
# delete only A (matched by symbol), B survives
echo '-:kprobes/ev vfs_read' >> kprobe_events
frees A's args (trace_probe_cleanup() -> traceprobe_free_probe_arg()),
but trace_probe_unlink() keeps the trace_probe_event because the probe
list is not empty. The event call stays registered via B while its
fields now reference freed memory. Any field lookup then reads it, e.g.
echo 'a1 == 1' > events/kprobes/ev/filter
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in strcmp+0xa7/0xb0
Call Trace:
strcmp
trace_find_event_field
parse_pred
process_preds
create_filter
apply_event_filter
event_filter_write
field->name references parg->name (kstrdup'd, freed with the probe) and,
for array arguments, field->type references parg->fmt (kmalloc'd, freed
with the probe) - the scalar type otherwise points at the static
fmttype rodata, which is safe.
Have traceprobe_define_arg_fields() duplicate the name and type strings
and anchor the copies on the trace_probe_event, which embeds the event
call and outlives every individual probe; trace_probe_event_free()
releases them.
The reproducer above triggers reliably; the field lookup and the delete
both run under event_mutex, so this is a dangling reference after
removal rather than a race.
The issue was found by the autokbug dynamic kernel fuzzer at Tencent
Yunding Lab. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98075 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC reference to the main program
fixups.c:jit_subprogs() rewrites BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads to contain real
function addresses. This function is invoked from bpf_jit_subprogs()
only when env->subprog_cnt > 1. Meaning that for any program like
below:
int main(void *ctx) {
void *ptr = main;
...
bpf_timer_set_callback(..., ptr);
...
}
The 'ptr' won't be ever converted to contain an address.
In combination with e.g. bpf_timer_set_callback() this would lead to a
function call at a bogus address.
Instead of complicating the implementation, just assume that no useful
program needs main to be a sync or async callback and reject
BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads for the main subprogram. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98074 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: do not clear curr_active_slave prematurely when releasing all slaves
When releasing all slaves during bond destruction (all == true),
__bond_release_one() unconditionally clears bond->curr_active_slave to
NULL in every iteration.
If a backup slave is released before the active slave,
bond_alb_deinit_slave() triggers rlb_teach_disabled_mac_on_primary(),
which increments the active slave dev promiscuity counter and sets
bond_info->primary_is_promisc = 1.
Because bond->curr_active_slave was prematurely cleared to NULL when
releasing the backup slave, the subsequent iteration releasing the active
slave evaluates oldcurrent as NULL, so bond_change_active_slave(bond, NULL)
is skipped. Consequently, bond_alb_handle_active_change() is never called
to decrement the promiscuity counter, permanently leaking promiscuous
mode on the physical device after bond teardown.
When oldcurrent == slave, bond_change_active_slave(bond, NULL) already sets
bond->curr_active_slave to NULL. We only need to avoid selecting a new
active slave when all == true. Replace the if (all) branch with
if (!all && oldcurrent == slave). | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98066 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: caiaq: Fix potential double-free at error path
The fix for caiaq driver's resource management to handle the errors
tries to release the resources in a common destructor call, but as a
sashiko review for another patch suggested, some of the audio
resources such as URBs have been already freed, and this may lead to a
double-free.
For addressing the double-free, call the common destructor function
from each place, and assure that the resource pointers get cleared. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98064 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix NULL-ptr-deref when showing a void BTF type
btf_modifier_show() resolves the modifier and then calls
btf_type_ops(t)->show() unconditionally. For the void type (type_id 0,
BTF_KIND_UNKN) kind_ops[] has no entry, so ->show is NULL.
A "const void" (a modifier resolving to void) cannot be a map key or
value - map_check_btf() rejects it because void has no size - so the map
dump path does not reach it. But bpf_snprintf_btf() takes a type_id
straight from the BPF program, and passing such a "const void" from the
vmlinux BTF NULL-derefs:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f]
RIP: 0010:btf_modifier_show (kernel/bpf/btf.c:2914)
Call Trace:
btf_type_show (kernel/bpf/btf.c:8251)
btf_type_snprintf_show (kernel/bpf/btf.c:8321)
bpf_snprintf_btf (kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1047)
bpf_prog_test_run_raw_tp (net/bpf/test_run.c:829)
__sys_bpf (kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4804)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
Fall back to btf_df_show() when the resolved type has no show op; it
emits the "" placeholder already used for kinds like
FWD and FUNC. bpf_snprintf_btf() then returns the length as usual. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98063 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix NULL-ptr-deref in btf_var_show()
btf_var_show() calls btf_type_id_resolve() unconditionally, which
dereferences btf->resolved_ids. That is NULL for a base BTF - e.g. the
vmlinux BTF that bpf_snprintf_btf() renders against - since base BTF is
not resolved during parsing. btf_modifier_show() guards this with
'if (btf->resolved_ids)', but btf_var_show() does not.
A BPF program that passes the type_id of a BTF_KIND_VAR from the vmlinux
BTF to bpf_snprintf_btf() thus NULL-derefs:
KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x46638-0x4663f]
RIP: 0010:btf_var_show (kernel/bpf/btf.c:2929)
Call Trace:
btf_type_show (kernel/bpf/btf.c:8259)
btf_type_snprintf_show (kernel/bpf/btf.c:8329)
bpf_snprintf_btf (kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1047)
bpf_prog_test_run_raw_tp (net/bpf/test_run.c:829)
__sys_bpf (kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4804)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
Resolve the var's type directly with btf_type_skip_modifiers() when
resolved_ids is NULL, mirroring btf_modifier_show(). | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98059 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Mark sched_process_wait argument as nullable
do_wait() passes wo->wo_pid to the sched_process_wait tracepoint.
kernel_wait4() leaves wo_pid NULL for wait4(-1), and
kernel_waitid_prepare() does likewise for waitid(P_ALL).
btf_ctx_access() currently types argument 0 as PTR_TO_BTF_ID |
PTR_TRUSTED. Without PTR_MAYBE_NULL, the verifier accepts an unchecked
dereference. Trusted pointer loads have no fault protection, so a wait for
any child can then cause a NULL pointer dereference in JITed BPF code.
Add sched_process_wait to raw_tp_null_args[] with argument 0 marked
nullable. The verifier rejects an unchecked dereference while preserving
access after the program checks the pointer for NULL. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98057 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ring-buffer: Add checking nr_subbufs to persistent ring buffer validation
Sashiko reported that the code was using meta->nr_subbufs without making
sure that it matched the nr_pages + 1 on data that was assuming the two
were the same.
Add a check to the persistent ring buffer validation code to make sure
that the saved nr_subbufs matches what we expect. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98056 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme: remove stale namespaces by NSID range during scan
nvme_scan_ns_list() drops the stale namespaces in each gap in the
reported NSID list one NSID at a time. Every iteration calls
nvme_find_get_ns() to look the namespace up and removes it if it is
present. The loop runs once per NSID in the gap rather than once per
namespace actually present.
NSIDs are 32-bit, so a target with a sparse NSID space can make a
single gap spin the loop billions of times with nothing to remove.
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#4 stuck for 26s!
Workqueue: nvme-wq nvme_scan_work [nvme_core]
RIP: 0010:__srcu_read_unlock+0xb/0x20
Call Trace:
nvme_find_get_ns+0x7d/0xb0 [nvme_core]
nvme_scan_ns_list+0xe8/0x280 [nvme_core]
nvme_scan_work+0x18a/0x280 [nvme_core]
process_one_work+0x197/0x380
worker_thread+0x2fe/0x410
kthread+0xe0/0x100
Rename nvme_remove_invalid_namespaces() to nvme_remove_nsid_range()
and give it an open (start, end) NSID range. ctrl->namespaces is
sorted by NSID, so the whole gap is dropped in a single walk that
stops once end is reached. This bounds the work by the namespaces
that are present instead of by the size of the gap. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98055 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: Intel: avs: Clean up the bus when fetching ML caps fails
snd_hdac_ext_bus_get_ml_capabilities() may fail and its return code
shall be checked and accounted for. Address the issue by updating the
error-path for avs_pci_probe().
At the same time, if the function in question succeeds but the next part
of avs_pci_probe() fails, the hlink list shall be cleaned up before
leaving the scope. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98054 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: Intel: avs: Fix unbalanced module reference count
strace_open() invokes try_module_get() which on success takes
the module reference. If any follow up operation causes
strace_open() to fail, the refcount shall be put down. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98052 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bcmasp: clear txcb->last before writing each descriptor
bcmasp_xmit() only wrote txcb->last = true for the final fragment
of an SKB; non-final fragments left the field untouched. If a
descriptor slot was reused while it still held a stale true from
a previous SKB (possible when tx_spb_ring_full() underreported
fullness), bcmasp_tx_reclaim() would see last == true mid-SKB and
call dev_consume_skb_any() prematurely, freeing the sk_buff while
its remaining fragments were still in flight.
Unconditionally clear txcb->last before the conditional set so every
descriptor slot starts from a known false state regardless of what a
prior transmission left behind. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98051 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bcmasp: fix tx_spb_ring_full() checking same slot cnt times
The loop initialised next_index from intf->tx_spb_index on every
iteration, so incr_ring() always produced the same result and only
one slot was ever tested. Move the initialisation before the loop
so each iteration advances next_index and the function correctly
checks that cnt consecutive descriptor slots are available before
allowing a new transmission. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98046 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Mark bpf_btf_find_by_name_kind() as sleepable
When bpf_btf_find_by_name_kind() finds a type in module BTF, it
returns a new BTF object fd through __btf_new_fd(). This reaches
anon_inode_getfd(), which can sleep while allocating or expanding the
current task fd table.
The helper prototype does not set might_sleep, so the verifier allows
the helper in non-sleepable contexts such as BPF timer callbacks. The
fd allocation can then sleep in softirq context and install the fd into
the interrupted task.
Mark the helper as sleepable. This preserves calls from the main body
of a sleepable syscall program while rejecting calls from its
non-sleepable regions. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98045 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Mark faultable stack helpers as sleepable
The faultable variants of bpf_get_stack() and bpf_get_task_stack() pass
may_fault=true into the common stack collection code. Resolving user-space
build IDs may then call build_id_parse_file() and block on filesystem
reads.
Neither helper prototype sets might_sleep. Since prototype selection uses
the sleepability of the whole program, the verifier can still allow these
helpers from a non-sleepable region within that program, such as an
explicit RCU or preemption-disabled region. The task-stack helper can also
be called from a non-sleepable timer callback of a sleepable program.
Mark both faultable prototypes as sleepable. The existing helper context
check then rejects these calls while continuing to allow them in genuinely
sleepable contexts. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98041 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Don't predict JMP32 pointer vs zero comparisons
Consider the following program:
r1 = map_value; /* low 32 bits are zero at runtime */
r6 = 0xdead000000000000;
if w1 != 0 goto l1;
l0: r1 += r6;
r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0);
exit;
l1: r6 = 0;
goto l0;
At the moment is_branch_taken() reports the jump as always taken,
because it does not distinguish between BPF_JMP and BPF_JMP32
comparisons when processing 'if w1 != 0 ...'. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98039 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Require MEM_PERCPU for percpu kptr stores
map_kptr_match_type() treats perm_flags as the set of register type flags
that a kptr field permits. Adding MEM_PERCPU to that set for
BPF_KPTR_PERCPU does not require the source register to carry it, however.
The subset test consequently accepts both a plain bpf_obj_new() allocation
and a referenced kernel pointer into a __percpu_kptr map field.
Loads from the field are always marked MEM_PERCPU. Consumers then treat the
stored value as the cookie returned by bpf_percpu_obj_new(): per-CPU pointer
helpers relocate it, and map teardown selects the per-CPU free path. A plain
allocation can therefore provide an arbitrary kernel read/write, while a
kernel pointer can be relocated into an invalid address or sent through a
missing destructor.
Require the source MEM_PERCPU flag to match the destination field kind.
This preserves valid bpf_percpu_obj_new() stores and rejects both the
program-BTF and kernel-BTF variants. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98037 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject untrusted allocated-object pointers
When the final RCU read-side critical section ends, a local kptr is demoted
to PTR_UNTRUSTED but retains MEM_ALLOC. The pointer may be NULL or may refer
to an object whose lifetime is no longer protected.
type_is_ptr_alloc_obj() nevertheless recognizes any PTR_TO_BTF_ID with
MEM_ALLOC as a live allocated object. In particular, a refcount-only local
kptr never carries NON_OWN_REF, so it still passes the
bpf_refcount_acquire() argument check after RCU protection ends. The kfunc
can then dereference NULL or stale memory.
Make type_is_ptr_alloc_obj() reject PTR_UNTRUSTED pointers. Since
type_is_non_owning_ref() is based on the same predicate, graph kfunc
arguments obey the same live-object requirement. Fault-protected reads of
the demoted pointer remain valid: writes are already rejected, and read
fixups use bpf_may_fault_on_deref() rather than this predicate.
[ kkd: Rewrote commit log ] | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98031 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nexthop: Initialize extack in remove_nh_grp_entry()
remove_nh_grp_entry() prints the extack message when a listener fails
to replace the reduced nexthop group. However, extack is not
initialized and listeners are not required to set a message when
returning an error. Neither netdevsim nor mlxsw do so when an
allocation fails, resulting in the dereference of an uninitialized
stack pointer.
Fix by zero-initializing extack, as was done in commit 6347c5314cee
("nexthop: initialize extack in nh_res_bucket_migrate()"). | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98030 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: bcm_sf2: bound the CFP rule dump by the caller's buffer size
bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_get_all() walks the whole cfp.unique bitmap into
rule_locs[] without consulting nfc->rule_cnt, which is how many entries
the caller had room for. ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL requires no CAP_NET_ADMIN
and the ioctl sizes the buffer from the rule_cnt userspace passes in, so
once an admin has installed CFP rules any user can ask for fewer slots
than there are rules and run off the end of the allocation. A rule_cnt
of 0 leaves the buffer pointer NULL and the walk dereferences it. | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98029 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: nfp: bound the ntuple rule dump by the caller's buffer size
nfp_net_get_fs_loc() dumps every entry of nn->fs.list into rule_locs[]
without consulting cmd->rule_cnt, which is how many entries the caller
had room for. ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL requires no CAP_NET_ADMIN and the
ioctl sizes the buffer from the rule_cnt userspace passes in, so once an
admin has installed flow steering rules any user can ask for fewer slots
than there are rules and run off the end of the allocation. A rule_cnt
of 0 leaves the buffer pointer NULL and the walk dereferences it.
Bail out with -EMSGSIZE when the buffer fills up, the way the other
ntuple capable drivers do, and report how many locations were filled so
a shrinking rule list does not leave the caller reading stale slots. | 2026-09-25 |
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